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Aristotle’s Th eory of Justice as the Basis of 
Rawls’ Justice as Fairness
Ian Hunt
Aristotle distinguishes between general justice and particular justice. I argue that 
this distinction identifi es a fundamental issue of justice that remains even in what 
Rawls terms a “well-ordered society”. Th is is the issue of the fair distribution of the 
burdens and benefi ts of social cooperation. Rawls develops Aristotle's conception of 
particular justice through arguing that the proper subject of justice as fairness is the 
“basic structure” of society. Further, his distinction between “ideal” and “non-ideal” 
theory clarifi es Aristotle’s otherwise confusing distinction within “particular” justice 
between distributive and corrective, or regulative, justice.
1. Introduction
In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle (1130a15–1130b5)1 subtly distinguishes between 
two meanings of “just” and “unjust”. First, people can be said to be “just” because 
they refrain from wronging others. Th e disposition to refrain from wronging 
others constitutes “perfect virtue” (1129b25–30) in relations with others. Aristotle 
calls this general or universal justice because it covers all ways of being just. He 
then says that he really wants to investigate justice or injustice in a special sense, 
illustrated not by the person who breaks the law but the one who takes more than 
a fair share. 
As Aristotle (1130a15–20) says, “when a man displays ... Cowardice ... though 
he acts unjustly, he is not taking more than his fair share of anything”. Nor do peo-
ple who take more than their fair share necessarily display any other lack of virtue 
than this. In taking more than their fair share they are being unjust but merely 
unjust. In other instances of injustice, a vice goes by another name, such as Cow-
ardice but, in this instance, it is simply being unjust. Aristotle (1130a30–1130b) 
reinforces this point by pointing out that if one person commits adultery for gain 
1 I follow the usual convention in referring to passages in Aristotle, which is to refer to the page num-
bers and column letters of the standard edition of the works of Aristotle, edited by Bekker. These 
page numbers and column letters are repeated in all modern editions of Aristotle’s works.
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or profi t, while another commits it from desire and possibly loses from it, both are 
unjust but only the second person is “profl igate” or wanton. Aristotle shows that 
there is a specifi c form of injustice in distribution, for which the usual term is sim-
ply that the gain or avoidance of burden is “unfair” or “unjust”. Aristotle possibly 
presses his point a bit far here, since we could say that the specifi c vice in ques-
tion is “greed”, just as the specifi c vice in running away from battle is cowardice. 
However, the crucial point is that this possibility of injustice remains and is vitally 
important to the well being of people, even when no other complaint of injustice 
can be made.
One way of isolating this specifi c form of injustice would be to suppose that 
people are otherwise virtuous. Th is is the supposition that Rawls (1971, 1999:7–8) 
makes to identify his specifi c concern with justice, which he distinguishes from 
other issues of justice by asking what principles of justice would apply when people 
by and large do the right thing. For, if people are by and large just or do not wrong 
others, we can remove from consideration issues involved in Aristotle’s other in-
stances of injustice, such as cowardice, adultery or bad temper, and ask what it 
would be to take only one’s fair share in these circumstances. Th us both Aristotle 
and Rawls seem concerned with identifying what is involved in what Aristotle calls 
“particular” justice. And this, as Aristotle and Rawls make clear, is a matter of deter-
mining how to share fairly the burdens and benefi ts of social cooperation. As Aris-
totle (1129a25–1129b10) notes, the unjust man will take more than his fair share of 
the things on which good fortune depends and avoids his fair share of burdens.
Although Aristotle and Rawls share this common concern, as Santas (2001:1, 
5–7) notes, Rawls consciously distinguishes his view of justice from that of Ari s-
totle in at least one important respect. Rawls aims only for a theory of justice that 
articulates the principles of a shared understanding in a community of what is just 
and unjust, without presupposing a comprehensive theory of the good, as Ari s totle 
does. Rawls only assumes that a thin conception of the good as all-purpose means 
of action (“primary goods”) will be shared among members of a political com-
munity. As we will see, such diff erences are important, but my primary purpose 
here is to show how Rawls also consciously builds on Aristotle’s theory of justice, 
starting from their shared concern to separate distributive justice from other 
issues of justice. 
Rawls not only restricts his theory to distributive justice but is more specifi cally 
concerned only with what constitutes just social arrangements for a society rather 
than just arrangements for local associations within the state or for relations between 
states. Rawls’ thus stipulates that his theory provides a political conception of justice. 
Th is is a second point of continuity with Aristotle (1134a25–30), who implicitly 
stipulates that his concern in the Nicomachean Ethics is with justice within a commu-
nity. However, there is also a degree of discontinuity on this point. Aristotle separates 
household justice, including domestic justice, from politi cal justice (1134b10–20), 
while Rawls intends his political conception to cover at least part of the distributive 
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arrangements within households. Th is part 
is the arrange ment of rights and duties be-
tween men and women, who are taken as 
equal citizens. A separate sphere of domestic 
jus tice in Rawls’ (2001:162–66) theory cov-
ers only the relation between parents and 
children and a personal division of labour 
and resources between parents within the 
household, though this must be consistent 
with their equal status. 
Rawls’ (1971, 1999:214) concern with 
po li tical justice thus in part accords with 
Aristo tle’s concern with the constitutive 
ele ment of human communities, which is 
their shar ed sense of what is good and bad, 
just and unjust: “For it is the peculiarity of 
humans, in contrast to the other animals, to 
have perception of good and bad and just 
and unjust and the like; and community in 
these things makes a household and a city-
state” (1253a15). As I have already noted, this accord is only partial because Rawls’ 
commitment to political liberalism, with its allowance of diverse views of what is 
good and evil within a community, requires that he take only a shared conception 
of what is just and unjust to be constitutive of a political community. On the other 
hand, in the case of the family or household, Rawls agrees with Aristotle that this 
specifi c community relies on a shared conception of the good as well as of justice if it 
is to function adequately. For Rawls (2001:163) presumes that the proper constitu-
tion of the family involves a shared perception of good and evil as well as of justice, 
including those forms of justice peculiar to the family, such as the morally proper 
relation between parents and children, even though these would be constrained by 
principles of justice (Rawls, 2001:165). Because it constrains domestic justice by 
social justice, Rawls’ theory also opens the possibility of fa milies whose founda-
tion is undermined by confl ict between the requirements of political justice and the 
requirements of a conception of domestic justice, such as that typical of the Greek 
culture of Aristotle’s time, which gave the male head of the household authority 
over his wife and treated children as virtually his slaves. Nevertheless, despite such 
diff erences, Rawls (1971, 1999:9–10) is thus to a signifi cant degree correct in claim-
ing that, despite appearances to the contrary, his concerns with justice accord with 
traditional treatments, of which Aristotle’s is exemplary.
2. Aristotle and Rawls on the Subject of Justice
John Rawls (1921–2002).
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Rawls initially fails to note one important point of diff erence between his theory 
and that of Aristotle. Rawls (1971, 1999:9) does note an important diff erence 
between his theory and Aristotle’s concern with the justice of individual acts of 
pleonexia, or unfair gain. For Rawls, the subject of justice is not the comparative 
advantages of particular individuals but rather the “basic structure” of society: the 
structure of social institutions that distribute rights and duties and the burdens and 
benefi ts of social cooperation. For Rawls (2001:32–33), general kinds of outcomes 
for individuals that a basic structure permits determine whether it can be accepted 
as just within an overlapping consensus but we cannot test whether a basic struc-
ture is just by comparing its outcomes for particular individuals with what a prior, 
independent criterion of justice would require.
True, as Rawls (1971, 1999:10) also points out, Aristotle’s concern with individ-
ual acts of unfairness is in some ways not remote from his. In the fi rst place, it pre-
supposes an account of what for individuals are just shares of the divisible goods 
of society. Secondly, Rawls claims that there is no reason to think that Aristotle 
would disagree with Rawls’ view, which is that these entitlements fl ow from social 
institutions. Further, as Rawls (1971, 1999:73) suggests, Aristotle does recognize the 
infl uence of social institutions on the justice of distribution, in so far as any view of 
justice will consider the basic structure to be important, though in diff ering ways. 
In Politics, Aristotle (1253a) regards justice as an element of the state, since it regu-
lates the political partnership or community for the common good. 
However, Aristotle clearly takes the primary subject of justice to be individuals 
and their situations rather than the basic structure of society. Aristotle (1131a, 15–
20) claims that “[the just] mean ... implies certain extremes between which it lies ... 
and certain persons for whom it is just. It follows therefore that justice involves at 
least four terms, namely two persons for whom it is just and two shares which are 
just. ... [I]t is when equals possess unequal shares, or persons not equal [have] equal 
shares, that quarrels and complaints arise”. 
In initially overdoing the degree of agreement between his and Aristotle’s treat-
ments of justice, Rawls fails to make it clear from the start that there is a funda-
mental diff erence between a theory of social justice like Aristotle’s, in which the 
justice of institutions is judged by reference to its accord with what would be just 
outcomes for particular individuals, and a theory like his, where the justice of out-
comes for particular individuals is a consequence of their being outcomes of just 
social institutions.
Rawls (1971, 1999:76) later argues that the task for justice set by Aristotle is 
practically impossible. On Aristotle’s view, it would be necessary to keep track of 
the relative position of diff erent individuals. It would be necessary to determine 
their relative merit and what unequal shares would be appropriate to their inequal-
ities in merit (1134b5). True, Aristotle does not think that the merit of individuals 
is to be determined daily or weekly — as parents might determine the merit of their 
children for good behaviour rewards — but by their established virtue.2 Neverthe-
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less, in a complex society, it would still be practically impossible to determine 
whether each and every change in shares of the burdens and benefi ts of social 
cooperation is in accord with the relative established virtue of individuals.
In addition, we have reason to consider that such a criterion of justice cannot be 
applied, even in principle, when it is taken as an absolute touchstone of just distri-
bution rather than a rule of thumb for particular situations. Th ere are many diff er-
ent kinds of merit and many diff erent burdens and benefi ts of social cooperation. 
In today’s world, the benefi ts of wealth and income are salient and commensurable 
through money. But burdens and kinds of merit are as incommensurably diverse 
today as they were in the Ancient world. Th e problem is that unequal individuals 
are not unequal in the same way: one may be a better musician but a lesser phi-
losopher than another; one may show virtue in the home, while another shows it in 
public life. It is clear that these virtues are not the same but not clear how diff erent 
their reward should be.
Th erefore, since an independent criterion of what is just for individual cases 
seems impossible, Rawls makes the basic structure of society the subject of jus-
tice, with the aim of establishing conditions that fair distributive procedures must 
satisfy. Rawls thus proposes that particular justice in the form of fairness in the 
distribution of the burdens and benefi ts of social cooperation must rely largely 
upon devices of what he terms “pure procedural justice”. Th e point of distribution 
in accordance with pure procedural justice is that the focus shift s from particular 
outcomes, and judgement of the justice of these through some criterion such as 
merit, to determining what type of distributive device will be fair, even though the 
judgement of this will take into account the range and general kinds of outcomes 
for individuals that it permits. 
In the case of pure procedural justice, if a device is fair, then its outcomes will 
automatically be fair. Rawls illustrates this with a lottery. Th e outcome of a lottery 
is fair just in case it is conducted fairly. A lottery is conducted fairly if the winner 
is determined by chance, according to procedures that are not subject to bias in 
favour of any individual. A further consideration of fairness may be the ratio of the 
take to the payout to winning tickets. In a charitable lottery, the take can be rela-
tively great, since those participating are not simply aft er reasonable prospects of 
windfall gain but to donate to charity. Without an understanding that the purpose 
of the lottery is other than windfall gain, a large take would clearly be exploitative. 
Outcomes play an even more important role in what should count as fair dis-
tribution of the burdens and benefi ts of social cooperation, since this determines 
everyone’s prospect of good fortune in life. Here the distributive device should be 
chosen so that outcomes are determined not so much by circumstance but by the 
contribution of each to the benefi ts to be distributed. Distribution by lottery would 
2 Aristotle (1131a25) compares overall or established virtue with other forms of desert, such as free 
birth or wealth, as supposed bases of distributive justice.
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thus be unfair. If Aristotle had posed the question of the fairness of a device for the 
distribution of the burdens and benefi ts of social cooperation, he would have been 
appalled at the idea that this should be signifi cantly determined by participation in 
the market. Aristotle thought that fair market transactions would leave the position 
of people unchanged, since they could only involve exchange of equals for equals, 
for mutual benefi t. In Aristotle’s world, citizens derived their income from their 
own — or their slaves’ — eff orts rather than from the market.3 In today’s world, 
markets are not only the primary source of income but we also have public debate 
over whether distribution should be left  overwhelmingly to market forces.
However, my aim here is not to go into Rawls’ arguments for giving a constrained 
role to the market, especially in determining overall incomes, and for maintaining 
a relatively equal distribution of wealth in social distribution. My claim is only that 
he is asking the right question: if distribution is to be determined by ongoing social 
arrangements, what are the fundamental conditions for these to be fair? In answer-
ing this question, Rawls takes the crucial step of initially assuming that people will 
generally do the right thing and then addresses the residual but fundamentally 
important question of what people in such circumstances would impartially con-
sider a fair distribution of the burdens and benefi ts of social cooperation.
3.  “Ideal” v. “Non-ideal” Th eory: 
 Distributive v. Regulative Justice
What if people do not comply with the requirements of justice? Or what if cir-
cumstances are not favourable to equal participation in social cooperation? Rawls 
does not address these questions directly. However, he does think that a fair basic 
structure must make provision for non-ideal conditions, at least when these could 
be consistent with society’s having a just basic structure. With regard to unjust 
(wrongful) individual actions, Rawls (1971, 1999:243) notes that, even in a well-
ordered society, coercive institutions that are ready to deal with wrongdoing may 
be necessary for security. In less ideal circumstances, such institutions will not only 
be present but also will act to punish and prevent widespread wrongdoing. Princi-
ples for dealing with wrongdoing constitute one part of non-ideal theory, accord-
ing to Rawls (1971, 1999:216). Th e other part “consists of principles for governing 
adjustments to natural limitations and historical contingencies”.
Th is distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory coincides with the separa-
tion of issues of distributive justice from those of corrective justice, although as I 
indicated above, the issues of distributive and regulative justice are not absolutely 
separate. Th is distinction also promises to make sense of one confusing aspect of 
Aristotle’s treatment of “particular” justice. Having initially distinguished particu-
lar from general justice by establishing that the former is concerned with fair as 
3 In ancient Athens, metics derived their income from the market but could not be full citizens.
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opposed to unfair gain, Aristotle (1130b30–1131a) then distinguishes between two 
kinds of particular justice: one is concerned with fair shares of divisible assets; 
the other “supplies a corrective principle” in private transactions. Aristotle terms 
it Corrective Justice, which clearly corresponds with one part of Rawls’ non-ideal 
theory. Corrective justice turns out to be concerned with two further types of issue: 
regulation of agreements or transactions that a person voluntarily enters into with 
others; and rectifi cation, including punishment, of injustices to which a person 
is involuntarily subjected (1131a5–10). Aristotle (1131b25–1132a5) interestingly 
distinguishes this from distributive justice by pointing out that the principles for 
achieving justice in these cases pay no regard to the character or position of the 
parties but only to the nature of what was done by one party to another. For Rawls, 
ideal theory is concerned with representative positions in the basic structure, 
whereas the two parts of non-ideal theory concern particular instances of wrong-
doing or unfortunate circumstance. 
Now Aristotle (1130a25–1130b) introduces particular justice by pointing out 
that the injustice involved committing adultery from lust rather than gain is not 
an issue of particular justice by contrast with committing adultery for profi t. Yet, 
clearly, an act of adultery is an issue for corrective justice, which Aristotle later 
includes within the scope of particular (corrective) justice. On the face of it, this is 
confusing. However, Rawls off ers a way of making sense of Aristotle’s distinction. 
Distributive justice is the only concern of political justice in ideal theory. However, 
political justice must also involve non-ideal theory, which is concerned with cor-
rective justice. Both ideal and non-ideal theory are concerned with institutions 
required to establish and protect justice. But the object of one is a basic structure 
which operates even in a “well-ordered society”, whereas the other concerns insti-
tutions which only come into operation when wrongdoing or misfortune reaches 
a signifi cant level. On this account, universal justice is concerned with violations 
of standards of justice or right conduct. Particular justice, on the other hand, is 
concerned, fi rstly, with our collective obligations to establish the fundamental dis-
tribution of rights and duties in society fairly and, secondly, with our collective 
obligation to secure citizens — so far as it is possible through punishment and 
compensation — from unfair changes to their fair expectations due to misconduct 
or misfortune.
4. Conclusion
It is clear that Rawls’ theory of justice builds on issues of justice raised by Aristotle 
in his Nichomachaean Ethics. From this perspective, we can better understand the 
aims of Rawls’ theory. It could also be said that Rawls can fully be understood only 
from this perspective. However, there are two ways in which Rawls improves upon 
Aristotle: Rawls takes the subject of distributive justice to be the basic structure 
of society rather than individual acts of wrongful gain; and he shows us how to 
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understand particular justice as being concerned with both distributive and regu-
lative institutions of justice without appearing thereby to muddle the distinction 
between distributive justice and justice in general.
Bibliography
Aristotle
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. H. Rackham. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1934.
Aristotle  
 Aristotle, Th e Politics of Aristotle. Translated with introduction, analysis and notes by Peter 
L. Phillips Simpson. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
Rawls, 1971, 1999
 John Rawls, A Th eory of Justice, Revised Edition. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University 
Press.
Rawls, 2001
 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Edited by Erin Kelly. Cambridge Mass.: Har-
vard University Press.
Santas, 2001
 G. Santas, Goodness and Justice, Oxford, Blackwell.
Hunt, Ian. 2007. Aristotle's Theory of Justice as the Basis of Rawls' Justice as Fairness. In E. Close, M. Tsianikas and G. Couvalis 
(eds.) "Greek Research in Australia: Proceedings of the Sixth Biennial International Conference of Greek Studies, Flinders University 
June 2005", Flinders University Department of Languages - Modern Greek: Adelaide, 45-52.
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
